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1. Introduction 
If the basic role of a market is to bring together potential buyers and sellers to 
reduce their search costs and facilitate trades, then understanding how participants meet 
to form trades would seem to be of fundamental importance. On the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), customers can submit their trading interest electronically (as system 
participants) or through floor brokers, and a specialist serves as a dedicated market maker 
for each stock. This paper uses detailed transaction data to examine how market 
participants form trades on the NYSE, or, more succinctly, to address the question: Who 
trades with whom, and when?  
Unfortunately, publicly available databases do not provide information on the 
types of participants involved in a trade. As a result, even the most basic questions, such 
as whether floor participants (floor brokers and specialists) trade mostly with other floor 
participants or with system participants, remain unresolved. These questions are key to 
understanding how market design impacts trading costs. Aitken, Cook, Harris, and 
McInish (2006) find that the NYSE has the lowest execution costs of seven major stock 
markets, a result they attribute to a combination of market design features, some of which 
are unique to the NYSE (such as floor brokers) and some of which are not (such as 
dedicated market makers, which are also found on the London Stock Exchange’s SEAQ, 
Euronext Paris, and Xetra). The present paper illuminates how these market design 
features are manifested in trade interactions and how these trade interactions in turn relate 
to trading costs.  
This paper considers two sets of empirical questions using non-public audit trail 
data from the NYSE. First, how do specialists, floor brokers, and system participants 
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interact on the NYSE? Specifically, under what conditions do trades occur between 
different types of participants? Are floor brokers primarily liquidity suppliers or 
demanders in trades involving floor brokers and system participants?  
Second, how does market quality differ for trades involving different 
combinations of participants? Specifically, are spreads higher or lower for trades 
involving floor participants only, system participants only, or both? How does 
information content vary in trades between different participants?  
The analysis of who trades with whom in this paper extends the traditional 
analysis of who trades.1 For example, consider a stock in which there are two trades of 
1000 shares each and, in total, floor brokers buy 1000 shares and sell 1000 shares and 
system participants buy 1000 shares and sell 1000 shares. Although each participant type 
accounts for 50% of twice total volume in the stock (who trades), buyers and sellers can 
meet in many in different combinations on the NYSE, giving rise to different trade 
compositions (who trades with whom). Two possibilities are illustrated in Figure 1. If 
one trade involves only floor brokers and the other trade involves only system 
participants, as in Scenario A, 50% of trading volume occurs in pure floor trades and 
50% occurs in pure system trades. In contrast, if both trades involve both floor brokers 
and system participants, as in Scenario B, 100% of trading volume occurs in floor and 
system interaction trades.  
Many interesting results emerge from this paper's analysis of who trades with 
whom. First, only 4% of the average stock's trading volume occurs in pure floor trades, 
46% occurs in floor and system interaction trades, and 50% occurs in pure system trades. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) on specialist trading and Sofianos and Werner (2000) 
on floor broker trading.  
  3 
These results are striking given that floor participants account for nearly 29% (comprised 
of 11% specialist and 18% floor brokers) and system participants account for 71% of the 
average stock's doubled trading volume. Thus floor trading and system trading are clearly 
not segmented on the NYSE. Relatively little trading volume is the result of floor brokers 
and specialists physically meeting on the trading floor.2 Pure floor trades and floor and 
system interaction trades are relatively more common when quoted spreads are wide, 
quoted depth is low, volume is high, and volatility is low.  
Second, most floor and system interaction trading volume occurs in trades with 
both floor and system participants on at least one side of the trade (rather than floor and 
system participants strictly on opposite sides of the trade). This finding suggests that the 
NYSE's auction mechanism consolidates liquidity from diverse sources on the same side 
of a trade. In trades with only floor participants on one side of the trade and only system 
participants on the other side, more trading volume is system-initiated than floor- initiated 
for the average stock. Across stocks, there is more floor- initiated than system-initiated 
trading volume in the largest stocks and more system-initiated than floor- initiated trading 
volume in smaller stocks. These patterns reflect the differences between the role of floor 
brokers, who represent investor orders and are typically more active in large stocks, and 
specialists, who are obligated to act as liquidity providers of last resort and account for 
more trading in small stocks.  
Third, pure floor trades and floor and system interaction trades generally have 
lower effective spreads than pure system trades in the same stock, after controlling for 
trade price, quantity, and intraday spread patterns. Within floor and system interaction 
                                                 
2 Although interactions on the floor account for only a small portion of trading volume, Battalio, Ellul, and 
Jennings (2005) find that stock relocations on the floor increase execution costs, suggesting that floor 
broker reputation plays an important role in liquidity on the NYSE.  
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trades, floor- initiated trades generally have lower effective spreads than system-initiated 
trades, likely reflecting floor participants' last-mover and informational advantages.  
Finally, trades involving automatic execution have the highest information 
content, despite the current restrictions limiting automatic execution to fewer than 1100 
shares and one trade per 30-second period. Floor- initiated interaction trades also have 
higher information content than pure floor and other interaction trades. There are several 
possible explanations for these results. Informed traders may prefer the speed and pre-
trade anonymity offered by automatic execution. 3 Floor brokers may avoid trading with 
other floor brokers or the specialist when representing informed order flow for 
reputational reasons, as in Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992), choosing to trade 
with system participants instead. Floor participants may also use their last-mover and 
floor-based informational advantages to avoid interacting with informed orders that come 
through the system.  
This paper is the first to use comprehensive data to examine how market 
participants meet to form trades, illuminating how the NYSE fulfills its basic role of 
matching buyers with sellers and complementing earlier work that examines order 
strategies and their execution quality implications. For example, Harris and Hasbrouck 
(1996) analyze market versus limit orders, and Keim and Madhavan (1996) examine 
upstairs versus downstairs trades. Werner (2003) finds that spreads and information 
content are affected by a trade’s order composition, measured as the net order types 
involved in a trade. Werner identifies trades according to whether they include particular 
order types on the buy-side, sell-side, both, or neither, to examine how the net presence 
                                                 
3 Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) show that trades on Electronic Communication Networks 
(ECNs) are generally more informed than trades on the Nasdaq dealer market, a finding similar in spirit to 
the findings here for the NYSE, which encompasses auction and automatic execution in a single market.  
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of each order type affects a trade’s execution. The present paper builds on this intuition in 
analyzing how the total composition of a trade is related to its execution quality.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 analyzes who trades with whom across different types of stocks. 
Section 4 explores who trades with whom under different market conditions. Section 5 
examines the relation between who trades with whom and market quality. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Data and methodology  
2.1. Sample construction and descriptive statistics  
A sample of 200 common stocks is selected as follows. First, the market 
capitalizations of all domestic common stocks listed on the NYSE as of year-end 2003 
are determined from CRSP. Second, the NYSE Master History file is used to eliminate 
stocks that were listed for only part of 2004 or changed symbol during the year. Third, 
stocks with prices below $1 or over $500 and stocks with two or fewer trades per day on 
average according to the NYSE Consolidated Trade (CT) file are eliminated. Finally, the 
remaining stocks are ranked by market capitalization and 20 stocks are selected randomly 
from each market capitalization decile.  
The main sample period is the 252 trading days in 2004. For the trade- level 
analyses in Sections 4 and 5, a sub-period of forty sample days is selected as follows. The 
252 trading days in 2004 are ranked by NYSE total volume, then four days are randomly 
selected from each volume decile. There are over 7.7 million trades in the forty days for 
the 200 sample stocks. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample of 200 stocks for the full year 
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2004. The sample has wide cross-sectional dispersion by design.  
2.2. Who trades and who trades with whom methodology  
The main data source for this analysis is the NYSE internal Consolidated Audit 
Trail (CAUD) file, which contains detailed information about all trades executed on the 
NYSE.4 The CAUD file matches buyers and sellers for each trade, providing information 
about all of the parties (floor as well as system) on each side of a trade in addition to the 
time, price, and quantity traded. Note that there can be more than one type of participant 
on each side of a single trade. For example, on January 8, 2004 at 10:26:37 there is trade 
print for 2400 shares at $13.04 in symbol AAI. The publicly available Trades and Quotes 
(TAQ) database reports the time, price, and quantity of the trade, but provides no 
information about who is trading. The CAUD file shows that the trade involves system 
participants buying 2400 shares versus system participants selling 400 shares, floor 
brokers selling 1000 shares, and the specialist selling 1000 shares. With this information 
it is possible to determine how much trading volume is attributable to each type of market 
participant (who trades) as well as how they meet to form trades (who trades with whom).  
Who trades is computed by summing the purchases and sales by each type of 
market participant (system, floor broker, and specialist) and dividing by twice total 
volume, since the numerator double-counts volume. The AAI trade described above has a 
who-trades composition of 58% system, 21% floor brokers, and 21% specialist.  
Who trades with whom is determined by identifying all of the types of market 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description of the CAUD file, see Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993) and Sofianos 
and Werner (2000). CAUD data are filtered to remove opening and closing trades, trades with incomplete 
information, and trades with unequal total purchase and sale quantities. Such records represent 
approximately 6% of the original trades.  
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participants involved in each trade and then categorizing the trade as follows:5 
Pure Floor =  Specialist and Floor Brokers, or  
Floor Brokers only; 
Pure System = System participants only; 
Floor and System Interaction =  Specialist and System participants, or 
  Floor Brokers and System participants, or 
  Specialist, Floor Brokers, and System 
participants. 
Note that in general the specialist and floor brokers choose whether or not to 
interact with system participants; the exception is when a floor broker or specialist has 
posted liquidity at the inside quote and is hit by an incoming automatic execution order.  
The AAI trade described above would be categorized as a floor and system interaction 
trade, because it involves the specialist, floor brokers, and system participants. Who-
trades-with-whom percentages are calculated by summing volume across trades in each 
category, then dividing by total traded volume.  
The CAUD data are also used to identify automatic execution (Direct+) system, 
percentage (CAP), and upstairs-arranged trades. Direct+ trades are executed without any 
manual involvement from the specialist, are restricted to fewer than 1100 shares, and can 
occur at the inside quote only. Direct+ represents about 7% of twice total volume for the 
average sample stock. 
Floor brokers leave CAPs with the specialist to execute based on a preset strategy, 
typically to participate up to 50% of the total volume in every trade satisfying the CAP’s 
limit price until the desired quantity is attained. CAPs are similar to VWAP (volume-
                                                 
5 Percentage (CAP) executions are included as floor broker executions. Incoming Intermarket Trading 
System (ITS) executions are included as system participant executions.  
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weighted average price) trades, but if there is insufficient liquidity available at a price the 
CAP may not participate in the same percentage of every trade’s volume and thus may 
not achieve the volume-weighted average price over the trading interval (see Werner 
(2003) for a more detailed discussion of CAPs). A CAP is a pre-set strategy that in 
practice may be either liquidity-demanding or liquidity-supplying, depending whether it 
is triggered by a liquidity demander on the same side or the opposite side of the market. 
For example, if a buy CAP is triggered by a market buy order, the CAP is liquidity-
demanding, while if the CAP is triggered by a market sell order, it is liquidity-supplying. 
CAPs represent about 11.5% of twice total volume for the average sample stock. 
Upstairs-arranged trades are identified as those trades having the same floor 
broker on both the buy and sell sides for at least a portion of the trade, as in Madhavan 
and Cheng (1997). Upstairs-arranged trades, which account for only 1.4% of trading 
volume for the average sample stock, are excluded from the analysis in this paper, as they 
take place outside of the trading mechanisms examined here.  
2.3. Market quality methodology  
Market quality is measured by effective and realized spreads and information 
content. To control for any effects caused purely by stock price differences, percentage 
spreads are calculated, that is, dollar spread divided by the trade price.  
Spreads are calculated from trade prices in the CAUD file and quotes in the 
NYSE Consolidated Quote (CQ) file.6 The effective spread is defined as: Effective 
Spreadt = 2I(Pt – Mt), where t denotes the trade, I is an indicator variable that equals one 
                                                 
6 Regular quote records are filtered to remove quotes that are indicated to be errors, related to special mode 
conditions, and locked or crossed bid and ask. Also excluded are quotes with zero or missing bid or ask 
prices, quotes that change 20% or more from the previous quote, and quotes whose spread exceeds 20% of 
the quote midpoint. These filters remove less than 0.1% of the quote records.  
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for buyer- initiated trades and negative one for seller- initiated trades, Pt is the trade price, 
and Mt is the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. Trades with Direct+ or market 
orders on only the buy (sell) side are identified as buyer- initiated (seller- initiated). The 
remaining trades are categorized as buyer- initiated (seller- initiated) if they occur above 
(below) the prevailing quote midpoint; trades occurring at the quote midpoint are 
categorized using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, assuming no lag between quote 
and trade times. The effective spread captures the immediate price impact of a trade.  
The realized spread is defined as: Realized Spreadt = 2I(Pt – Mt+5) , where Mt+5 is 
the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade. Realized spreads are also calculated using 
the quote midpoint 30 minutes after the trade, as a robustness check. The realized spread 
measures the price reversal after a trade, approximating the liquidity provider’s profit net 
of the trade’s price impact.  
The difference between the effective spread (what liquidity demanders pay) and 
the realized spread (what liquidity providers earn) is used as a measure of the information 
content of a trade. The information content is equal to the signed difference between the 
quote midpoints at the time of the trade and five minutes after the trade.  
3. Who trades with whom analysis  
This section first presents an overall analysis of who trades and who trades with 
whom. Next it examines floor and system interaction trades to determine to what extent 
the trades are floor- initiated or system-initiated. The section concludes by analyzing the 
prevalence of Direct+ (automatic) executions in different types of trades.  
3.1. Who trades versus who trades with whom 
Figure 2 depicts who trades for the average sample stock. Specialists account for 
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11%, floor brokers account for 18%, and system participants account for 71% of twice 
total volume. These percentages reveal a significant shift over recent years: Sofianos and 
Werner (2000) document that in 1997, although specialists represented 11% as now, floor 
brokers represented 44% and system participants represented only 45% of twice total 
volume, and Cooney and Sias (2003) find that floor brokers represented an even larger 
proportion of volume in the 1990-1991 period covered by the NYSE TORQ database. In 
2004 as in 1997, specialists tend to trade more on a percentage basis in smaller stocks, 
while floor brokers trade more in larger stocks and system participants trade more in the 
middle deciles.  
Figure 3 depicts how market participants come together to form trades, or who 
trades with whom. Each trade is categorized by the combination of participants involved 
in the trade, and trade-type volumes are divided by total volume to determine trade-type 
percentages. Pure floor trades (trades involving only floor brokers or floor brokers and 
specialist) are the least common trades on the NYSE, averaging 4% of the average 
stock’s trading volume.7 Pure system trades (involving only system participants) and 
floor and system interaction trades (involving a combination of floor and system 
participants) account for 46% and 50% of the average stock’s trading volume.  
Figure 4 depicts how who trades with whom varies across stocks. Floor and 
system interaction trades involve a higher percentage of volume than pure system trades 
in the largest and smallest stocks, while pure system trades peak on a relative basis in the 
middle deciles. Table 2 disaggregates each trade type into finer categories, revealing the 
                                                 
7 Note that who-trades-with-whom percentages are based on share volume, not number of trades. The 
results would be more extreme if percentages were based on the number of trades, as pure floor trades have 
an average trade size of 2810 shares, compared to 817 shares for floor and system interaction trades and 
351 shares for pure system trades.   
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precise combinations behind the general patterns. Pure floor broker trades are more 
common in the largest stocks, reflecting the greater frequency with which a crowd of 
more than one floor broker assembles in larger than in smaller stocks. The convex shape 
of the floor and system interaction trade type percentages across deciles is driven by two 
sub-categories of interaction trades: specialist and system trades, which rise sharply for 
smaller stocks, and trades involving all three participant types, which are highest for the 
largest stocks. The small-stock results are consistent with the intuition of Glosten (1989) 
that specialists are more likely to act as dealers in less-active stocks, providing liquidity 
to incoming system orders. The large-stock results provide the clearest illustration of all 
three sources of liquidity supply and demand (from the specialist, floor brokers, and 
system participants) coming together in the NYSE auction to form a single trade.  
A natural question is how these trade-type results compare to expectations. There 
are two potentially useful benchmarks for what percentage of trading might occur 
between different participant types in a market where both floor and electronic order 
submission are possible: complete segmentation and random interaction. If floor and 
system participants were completely segmented, volume would be split between pure 
floor trades and pure system trades in the same ratio as overall trading volume: about 
29% pure floor, 71% pure system, and 0% floor and system interaction trades. Clearly 
this is not a realistic model for trading at the NYSE, as floor and system interaction trades 
represent 45% of trading volume in the average stock.  
Alternatively, if floor and system participants met randomly, volume would be 
split according to the probability of each participant type meeting the same type or 
another type. Table 3 compares the actual trade-type percentages to baseline estimates 
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calculated from each stock’s percentage of trading by specialist, floor broker, and system 
participants, assuming traders meet randomly but that a specialist cannot trade with 
himself. Floor and system interaction trades are significantly more common (46% actual 
versus 38% baseline) and pure floor trades and pure system trades are both less common 
than the baseline percentages. This divergence implies that market participants do not 
meet randomly to form trades on the NYSE, suggesting that at least some participants 
benefit from interacting with other types of participants.  
The following sections analyze each trade type in more detail to explore the 
subtleties of who trades with whom. For example, is the higher-than-random incidence of 
floor and system interaction trades driven by either floor or system participants 
aggressively seeking liquidity from the other? Or is it a sign of the NYSE's auction 
mechanism consolidating multiple sources of liquidity supply and demand? What role do 
automatic executions play in pure system trades and floor and system interaction trades?  
3.2. Floor and system interaction trade initiators 
Table 4 separates floor and system interaction trades by which participant type 
initiates the trade. Trades are categorized as buyer- initiated or seller-initiated as described 
in Section 2.3, and then trades which have only floor participants on one side (buy or sell) 
and only system participants on the other side are categorized as floor- initiated or system-
initiated.8 For example, a trade that occurs above the midquote with system participants 
buying and floor participants selling is categorized as system-initiated. Trades with a mix 
of floor and system participants on at least one side, such as the AAI example in Section 
2.2, are categorized as mixed-initiator.  
                                                 
8 Robustness of the results to possible misclassification of buyer- versus seller-initiated trades is checked by 
excluding trades within the bid-ask spread, as recommended by Odders-White (2000). Results are 
qualitatively similar and are available on request. 
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Table 4 shows that there is more system-initiated than floor- initiated trading 
volume in all but the three largest stock deciles, where floor brokers are most active. 
These results are consistent with Sofianos and Werner's (2000) conjecture that a floor 
broker's services as a "smart limit order book" are more often used in the most active 
stocks, where a floor broker's last-mover and informational advantages are greatest. 
Nonetheless, over half of the floor and system interaction trading volume is in the mixed-
initiator category, suggesting that liquidity supply and demand usually come from more 
than one source simultaneously on the NYSE.  
3.3. Direct+ analysis  
Table 5 analyzes the composition of trades involving Direct+, or automatic 
execution. Trades involving Direct+ constitute about 15% of the average stock's volume 
in this sample. Most trades involving Direct+ are pure system trades, but they can be 
floor and system interaction trades if a specialist or floor broker is part of the inside quote 
at the time a Direct+ execution occurs. Because all public limit orders on the book must 
be filled before the specialist trades at the same price under NYSE rules, it is not 
surprising that the specialist participates in few automatic execution trades. Trades 
involving Direct+ are relatively more common in the middle market-capitalization 
deciles, although more Direct+ shares traded on an absolute basis in the largest stock 
deciles, given their higher volume levels.  
4. When does who trade with whom? 
This section analyzes how who trades with whom is related to market conditions, 
first at the daily level and then at the trade level. The association between daily who-
trades-with-whom percentages and market conditions is examined with the following 
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regression, estimated for each stock over 252 trading days using GMM with Newey-West 
standard errors: 
WTWW%t = a + b1LogPricet + b2LogVolumet + b3Volatilityt  
+ b4LogMktVolumet + b5MktVolatilityt + e t ,          (1) 
where t denotes the day, WTWW% is the demeaned percentage of trading volume 
in a particular who-trades-with-whom category (pure floor, floor and system interaction, 
or pure system), LogPrice is the natural logarithm of the stock’s closing price, 
LogVolume is the natural logarithm of the stock’s daily volume, Volatility is 100 times 
the daily stock return squared, LogMktVolume is the natural logarithm of the NYSE’s 
daily volume, and MktVolatility is 100 times the daily S&P500 return squared.9  
Table 6 presents the results for regression Eq. (1) of the pure floor percentage in 
Panel A, the floor and system interaction percentage in Panel B, and the pure system 
percentage in Panel C. Mean coefficient estimates and percentages of coefficients that are 
significantly positive and negative at the 5% level are reported for the full stock sample 
and the top two and bottom two deciles. There is relatively more pure floor trading, more 
floor and system interaction trading, and less pure system trading on higher volume days. 
This finding suggests a time-series analog to floor broker behavior in the cross section: 
Just as floor brokers are more likely to congregate (and therefore potentially interact with 
each other and the specialist) in more active than less active stocks, they are more likely 
to congregate around a given stock on days when tha t stock’s trading volume is higher. 
Overall, there is relatively less pure floor trading and interaction trading when a stock is 
more volatile, suggesting that in volatile periods system trading dominates floor activity. 
                                                 
9 Robustness checks using the VIX options volatility index as a proxy for market volatility yield 
qualitatively similar results.  
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An exception occurs in small stocks: Floor and system interaction trading is higher for 
some small stocks when volatility is higher, perhaps because heightened volatility makes 
the services of a floor broker more valuable or encourages the specialist to step in and 
provide liquidity to system participants. Finally, after adjusting for a stock’s own daily 
volume, its pure floor trading percentage is negatively related to market-wide volume, 
and this effect is particularly prominent in large stocks. This result suggests that floor 
brokers and specialists focus less on a particular stock when other stocks are more active, 
consistent with Corwin and Coughenour’s (2005) analysis of limited attention and 
specialist trading.  
The combination of participants in an individual trade is likely to be related to the 
market conditions preceding the trade as well as intraday volume and volatility. The 
following probit regression is used to examine these relations for each stock in the 40-day 
sub-period:   
Probability(WTWW)n = a + b1LogTradePricen + b2LogTradeSizen  
 + b3QuotedSpreadn + b4QuotedDepthn + b5Volume15n 
+ b6Volatility15n + b7PureFloorn-1 + b8PureSystemn-1  
+ å
=
10
1i
giVolumeDecilen + å
=
13
1j
d jHalfHourIntervaln + en ,         (2) 
where n denotes the trade; WTWW is the trade type (pure floor, floor and system 
interaction, or pure system); LogTradePrice is the natural logarithm of the trade price; 
LogTradeSize is the natural logarithm of the trade size; QuotedSpread is percentage best 
bid-ask spread at the time of the trade; QuotedDepth is the average number of shares at 
the best bid and best ask quotes at the time of the trade; Volume15 is the dollar volume 
traded in the previous 15 minutes; and Volatility15 is the absolute value of the stock 
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return over the previous 15 minutes. The last four variables are controls: PureFloorn-1 and 
PureSystemn-1 equal one if the previous trade was a pure floor trade or a pure system 
trade, respectively, else zero; VolumeDecile equals one if the trade occurs during a 
particular volume-decile day (based on market volume), else zero; HalfHourInterval 
equals one if the trade occurs during a particular half hour during the day, else zero.10  
Table 7 presents the results for regression Eq. (2) of the pure floor trade 
probability in Panel A, floor and system interaction trade probability in Panel B, and pure 
system trade probability in Panel C. Mean coefficient estimates, mean linear probability 
slopes, and the percentages of coefficients that are significantly positive and negative at 
the 5% level are presented for the full stock sample and the top two and bottom two 
deciles. Pure floor trades and interaction trades occur with higher probability when 
quoted spreads are wide and quoted depth is low. These are times when the services of a 
floor broker are likely to be most valuable and the specialist is more likely to act as 
liquidity provider of last resort. Pure floor trades and interaction trades are also more 
likely to occur when trading volume is higher, controlling for trade size, and volatility is 
lower. These results extend the intuition from the daily regressions in Table 6 to the 
intraday level, showing that who trades with whom is affected by quote conditions at the 
time of the trade in addition to volume and volatility conditions.  
5. Who trades with whom and market quality 
This section examines the association between market quality and who trades 
with whom trade types. The following regression is estimated for each stock in the 40-
                                                 
10 Robustness checks show that including more lags of the trade-type indicators does not affect the 
coefficients of interest.  
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day sub-period, using GMM with Newey-West standard errors:11  
MQstatn = a + b1LogTradePricen + b2LogTradeSizen + b3PureFloorn 
+ b4Interactionn + b5 Int_FlrInitn + b6 Int_SysInitn  
+ b7Specialistn + b8CAPn + b9Direct+n  
+ å
=
10
1i
giVolumeDecilen + å
=
13
1j
d jHalfHourIntervaln + en         (3) 
where n denotes the trade, MQStat is the market quality statistic (effective spread, 
realized spread, or information content), and LogTradePrice, LogTradeSize, 
VolumeDecile, and HalfHourInterval are defined as in Eq. (2). The remaining variables 
are indicator variables set equal to one if the trade is in the category, else zero: PureFloor 
indicates that the trade involves floor participants (specialist and floor brokers) only; 
Interaction indicates that the trade involves both floor and system participants; Int_FlrInit 
indicates that the trade is an interaction trade initiated by the floor participants; 
Int_SysInit indicates that the trade is an interaction trade initiated by the system 
participants; Specialist indicates that the specialist participates in the trade; CAP indicates 
that the trade involves execution of a CAP;  and Direct+ indicates that the trade involves 
automatic execution.   
Table 8 presents the results for regression Eq. (3) of effective spreads in Panel A, 
realized spreads in Panel B, and information content in Panel C.12 Mean coefficient 
estimates and the percentages of coefficients that are significantly positive and negative 
at the 5% level are presented for regressions on selected subsets of the right-side 
variables, building up to the full specification. The first two right-side variables control 
for basic trade characteristics other than who trades with whom.  
                                                 
11 Pooled regressions with stock fixed effects yield identical inference and are available on request.  
12 Results reported in Table 8 are based on five-minute realized spread and information content measures; 
results using 30-minute measures are qualitatively similar and are available on request.  
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Several results linked to who trades with whom are apparent from Table 8. Note 
that since the right-side variables include pure floor trades and floor and system 
interaction trades, pure system trades are implicitly captured in the regression constant 
and serve as the baseline against which the other trade types are measured.  
First, pure floor trades have lower effective spreads than pure system trades 
overall, but this effect arises specifically from pure floor trades involving CAPs, which 
are passive trading strategies. Pure floor trades that do not involve CAPs actually have 
higher effective spreads on average. Similarly, the higher realized spreads and lower 
information content for pure floor trades are attributable to the presence of CAPs, which 
as preset, patient trading strategies are not likely to be used for informed trades.  
Second, floor and system interaction trades in general have higher realized 
spreads and lower information content than pure system trades. By initiator type, floor-
initiated interaction trades have significantly lower effective and realized spreads and 
higher information content. Together with the pure floor trade findings, these results 
suggest that floor brokers handling an informed order tend to trade with system orders 
rather than with other floor brokers or the specialist, consistent with theories of the 
importance of reputation in a face-to-face trading environment with repeated interactions 
(Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992), Battalio, Ellul, and Jennings (2005)). Since 
investors choose whether to submit system orders or use floor brokers to represent their 
orders on the floor, in equilibrium the lower effective spread for floor- initiated trades 
should offset the higher cost of using a floor broker to work a trade. Mixed-initiator 
interaction trades, which represent the greatest consolidation of trading interest, reveal far 
less information than floor- initiated trades.  
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Third, taken together, the pure floor trade and floor and system interaction trade 
results show that trades involving the floor generally have lower information content than 
pure system trades. Floor- initiated interaction trades are more informative than pure 
system trades, consistent with Werner’s (2003) finding that liquidity-demanding floor 
broker orders are the most informative order type in 1997 data, but they are no longer the 
most informative trades on the NYSE. The most informative trades are now Direct+, 
suggesting that despite the size and frequency restrictions, Direct+ is regularly used by 
informed traders. Informed traders' use of Direct+ likely reflects their desire for execution 
speed as well as pre-trade anonymity.  
Finally, trades involving the specialist generally have higher realized spreads, 
reflecting the specialist’s role as liquidity provider of last resort, and lower information 
content, suggesting that the specialist’s last-mover advantage and relationships on the 
floor enable him to avoid participating in most informed trades.  
6. Conclusions  
This paper examines how market participants meet to form trades on the NYSE. 
Little trading volume is currently executed in pure floor trades, and nearly half of trading 
volume in the average stock involves floor and system participants trading together, 
usually with both participant types on at least one side of the trade. This result suggests 
that the NYSE's predominant auction mechanism blends liquidity arriving through many 
routes, a consolidation that may explain why trading costs are lower on the NYSE than 
on other exchanges with different market structures. The market quality analysis suggests 
that neither floor brokers nor specialists necessarily lead to lower trading costs in 
isolation. Rather, their interactions with other market participants may lead to enhanced 
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consolidation of trading interest and therefore lower transaction costs.  
When floor and system participants are on opposite sides of a trade, floor- initiated 
trades generally have lower effective spreads than system-initiated trades. This result 
probably reflects the last-mover and informational advantages of floor participants, and in 
equilibrium should offset the higher cost of an investor’s using a floor broker instead of 
submitting a system order. Information content is highest for trades involving automatic 
execution, but floor- initiated interaction trades also have high information content. These 
results are consistent with informed traders’ desire for speed and anonymity as well as 
predictions that floor brokers avoid representing informed orders in trades with other 
floor brokers or the specialist to preserve their reputations on the trading floor.  
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Figure 1: Example of Who Trades versus Who Trades with Whom 
Floor broker buys 1000 shares System buys 1000 shares
Floor broker sells 1000 shares System sells 1000 shares
50% Floor Broker
50% System
Trade type: Pure Floor Trade type: Pure System 50% Pure Floor
50% Pure System
Floor broker buys 1000 shares System buys 1000 shares
System sells 1000 shares Floor broker sells 1000 shares
50% Floor Broker
50% System
100%Trade type: Floor and System 
Interaction
Trade 1
Pure Floor trades have only floor participants (floor brokers and specialist) on both sides of the trade; Pure System trades 
have only system participants on both sides of the trade; Floor and System Interaction trades have both floor and system 
participants involved in the trade. Who Trades is calculated as the total shares bought and sold by each participant type, 
divided by twice total volume.  Who Trades with Whom is calculated as the number of shares traded in each trade type, 
divided by total volume. 
Scenario A
Trade type: Floor and 
System Interaction
Floor and 
System 
Interaction
Who Trades with Whom
Scenario B
Who TradesTrade 2
Figures 2 & 3
Figure 2: Who Trades
Figure 3: Who Trades with Whom
Who Trades depicts the percentage of twice daily volume accounted for by the purchases and sales of specialist, 
floor broker, and system participants, respectively. Who Trades with Whom depicts the percentage of daily 
volume accounted for by trades involving floor participants (specialist and floor brokers) only, floor and system 
participants together, and system participants only. Average daily percentages are calculated for each symbol 
across 252 trading days in 2004, and mean percentages are reported across 200 stocks in the full sample. Data 
are from NYSE CAUD file.
Who Trades, full sample
System 71%
Specialists 
11%
Floor Brokers 
18%
Who Trades with Whom, full sample
Pure Floor 4%
Floor & System 
Interaction 
46% Pure System 
50%
Figure 4: Who Trades with Whom by Decile
The figure depicts the percentage of daily volume accounted for by trades involving floor participants (specialist 
and floor brokers) only, floor and system participants together, and system participants only. Average daily 
percentages are calculated for each symbol across 252 trading days in 2004, and mean percentages across 20 
stocks each market capitalization decile are depicted in the graph below. Data are from NYSE CAUD file.
Who Trades with Whom, by decile
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
Full Sample 40.94 35.14 2.24 364.00 704,425    300,280     4,332         9,731,303    967        697        6            4,942     
By decile:
Largest stocks = 1 63.71 57.13 25.07 110.45 2,937,054 2,601,114  644,345     9,731,303    2,745     2,216     1,606     4,942     
2 50.19 45.38 22.36 126.89 1,218,132 1,047,028  460,645     2,340,615    1,717     1,640     1,098     2,860     
3 39.30 34.43 13.87 94.47 808,702    715,196     182,020     1,931,093    1,239     1,145     515        2,615     
4 64.59 47.28 18.13 364.00 488,411    351,046     13,791       1,980,046    909        775        74          1,857     
5 40.50 39.47 16.80 76.50 446,372    402,856     73,673       887,490       898        917        248        1,446     
6 44.95 36.40 5.86 147.78 525,924    214,865     34,144       2,056,896    790        686        107        1,506     
7 33.08 30.83 15.17 70.03 227,695    171,698     9,357         1,043,446    538        570        41          1,267     
8 30.16 30.05 17.61 51.05 135,595    104,145     21,648       469,348       381        358        98          887        
9 29.62 29.16 6.78 56.92 147,892    91,956       24,381       651,106       319        287        113        823        
Smallest stocks = 10 13.28 11.88 2.24 27.65 108,469    40,050       4,332         744,646       133        103        6            365        
Average daily closing price Average daily share volume Average number of trades per day
Average closing price, share volume, and number of trades per day are calculated for each symbol across 252 trading days in 2004, and statistics are reported across 200 
stocks in the full sample, 20 stocks in each market-capitalization decile. Data are from CRSP and NYSE CAUD files. 
Table 2: Who Trades with Whom
Pure System
Floor Brokers 
Only
Floor Brokers 
& Specialist Subtotal
Floor Brokers 
& System
Floor Brokers, 
Specialist, & 
System
Specialist & 
System Subtotal
System 
Only
Full Sample 1.5% 2.9% 4.4% 12.3% 15.6% 17.6% 45.5% 50.1%
By decile:
Largest stocks = 1 2.1% 2.6% 4.7% 12.3% 22.9% 14.2% 49.4% 46.0%
2 1.9% 2.8% 4.7% 13.5% 20.2% 13.6% 47.3% 47.9%
3 2.2% 3.5% 5.7% 15.0% 19.9% 12.2% 47.1% 47.2%
4 1.5% 2.9% 4.4% 13.2% 15.4% 14.7% 43.3% 52.3%
5 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 13.3% 16.1% 15.0% 44.4% 50.9%
6 1.2% 2.6% 3.8% 11.9% 14.5% 17.1% 43.5% 52.7%
7 1.1% 2.8% 3.9% 11.1% 12.9% 17.6% 41.7% 54.4%
8 1.2% 3.1% 4.3% 12.5% 12.4% 17.5% 42.4% 53.3%
9 1.1% 3.1% 4.2% 11.5% 11.1% 22.6% 45.2% 50.6%
Smallest stocks = 10 1.0% 2.9% 3.8% 9.2% 10.7% 31.1% 51.0% 45.2%
Pure Floor Floor & System Interaction
The table depicts the percentage of daily volume accounted for by trades involving floor participants (specialist and floor brokers) only, floor and system participants together, and 
system participants only. Average daily percentages are calculated for each symbol across 252 trading days in 2004, and mean percentages are reported across 200 stocks in the full 
sample, 20 stocks in each market capitalization decile. Data are from NYSE CAUD file. 
Table 3: Who Trades with Whom Actual versus Baseline
Actual Baseline
Actual - 
Baseline p-value Actual Baseline
Actual - 
Baseline p-value Actual Baseline
Actual - 
Baseline p-value
Full Sample 4.4% 8.7% -4.3% <.0001 45.5% 37.6% 7.9% <.0001 50.1% 53.7% -3.6% <.0001
By decile:
Largest stocks = 1 4.7% 10.3% -5.6% <.0001 49.4% 41.2% 8.2% <.0001 46.0% 48.5% -2.6% 0.0005
2 4.7% 10.6% -5.8% <.0001 47.3% 40.5% 6.8% 0.0255 47.9% 48.9% -1.0% 0.0797
3 5.7% 12.0% -6.3% <.0001 47.1% 40.1% 7.0% <.0001 47.2% 47.9% -0.8% 0.1113
4 4.4% 8.6% -4.2% <.0001 43.3% 36.8% 6.4% <.0001 52.3% 54.5% -2.2% 0.0026
5 4.7% 8.9% -4.2% <.0001 44.4% 38.1% 6.3% <.0001 50.9% 53.0% -2.1% 0.0390
6 3.8% 7.3% -3.5% <.0001 43.5% 36.1% 7.4% 0.0378 52.7% 56.6% -3.9% 0.0001
7 3.9% 7.3% -3.4% <.0001 41.7% 34.4% 7.3% <.0001 54.4% 58.3% -3.9% <.0001
8 4.3% 7.9% -3.6% <.0001 42.4% 35.1% 7.3% <.0001 53.3% 57.0% -3.7% <.0001
9 4.2% 7.3% -3.1% <.0001 45.2% 36.4% 8.7% <.0001 50.6% 56.3% -5.6% <.0001
Smallest stocks = 10 3.8% 7.2% -3.5% <.0001 51.0% 37.4% 13.6% <.0001 45.2% 55.4% -10.2% <.0001
Pure Floor Floor & System Interaction Pure System
Actual depicts the percentage of daily volume accounted for by trades involving floor participants only (pure floor), both floor and system participants together (floor 
and system interaction), and system participants only (pure system). Baseline reports the percentage of daily volume that would be expected to occur in pure floor, floor 
and system interaction, and pure system trades if participants met randomly to form trades. Actual minus Baseline differences are calculated for each symbol and day, 
then averaged across days by symbol, and p-values are reported across 200 stocks in the full sample, 20 stocks in each market capitalization decile. Data are from NYSE 
CAUD file. 
Table 4: Who Trades with Whom in Floor & System Interaction Trades by Trade Initiator
Floor-
Initiated
System-
Initiated
Mixed-
Initiator
Total 
Interaction
Full Sample 10.0% 12.3% 23.2% 45.5%
By decile:
Largest stocks = 1 8.2% 6.1% 35.2% 49.4%
2 9.1% 7.6% 30.6% 47.3%
3 9.8% 8.8% 28.5% 47.1%
4 9.8% 11.0% 22.6% 43.3%
5 10.4% 11.1% 22.9% 44.4%
6 9.9% 11.8% 21.9% 43.5%
7 9.9% 12.6% 19.1% 41.7%
8 10.0% 15.2% 17.2% 42.4%
9 11.1% 16.4% 17.7% 45.2%
Smallest stocks = 10 11.6% 22.3% 17.1% 51.0%
This table reports the percentage of daily volume accounted for by floor and system interaction trades analyzed by 
initiator type: trades are identified by whether they appear to be initiated by floor participants, system participants, or 
mixed floor and system participants. Average daily percentages are calculated for each symbol across 252 trading days 
in 2004, and mean percentages are reported across 200 stocks in the full sample, 20 stocks in each market capitalization 
decile. Data are from NYSE CAUD file. 
Table 5: Who Trades with Whom -- Direct+
System Only
Specialist & 
System
Floor Brokers 
& System
Floor Brokers, 
Specialist, & 
System
Total Volume 
% in Trades 
with Direct+
Full Sample 13.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.2% 14.8%
By decile:
Largest stocks = 1 12.1% 0.9% 0.2% 0.1% 13.3%
2 12.9% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2% 14.6%
3 12.2% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 13.7%
4 13.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 15.6%
5 14.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 16.1%
6 15.5% 1.0% 0.6% 0.3% 17.4%
7 16.4% 0.9% 0.6% 0.3% 18.3%
8 15.3% 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 18.0%
9 13.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.3% 15.1%
Smallest stocks = 10 5.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 6.2%
The table reports the percentage of daily volume accounted for by trades involving Direct+ (automatic 
execution), analyzed by the participant types involved. Average daily percentages are calculated for each 
symbol across 252 trading days in 2004, and mean percentages are reported across 200 stocks in the full 
sample, 20 stocks in each market capitalization decile. Data are from NYSE CAUD file. 
Table 6: Who-Trades-With-Whom Time Series Regressions
Mean 
Estimate
% 
Positive
% 
Negative
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Panel A: Dependent Variable = %PureFloor
Constant -0.136 41% 59% 4% 13% -0.112 5% 18% -0.090 0% 10%
LogPrice -0.023 42% 58% 15% 27% -0.011 26% 23% -0.027 5% 18%
LogVolume 0.037 99% 1% 95% 1% 0.044 95% 0% 0.035 93% 0%
Volatility -0.080 22% 78% 4% 34% -0.139 3% 31% -0.037 0% 30%
LogMktVolume -0.012 27% 73% 2% 16% -0.022 0% 28% -0.010 5% 5%
MktVolatility -0.029 46% 54% 2% 2% 0.021 0% 0% -0.144 0% 3%
Panel B: Dependent Variable = %Interaction
Constant -0.716 28% 72% 5% 21% -1.105 0% 28% -0.137 5% 5%
LogPrice -0.057 44% 56% 16% 27% 0.005 23% 15% -0.044 20% 23%
LogVolume 0.091 96% 4% 86% 2% 0.115 100% 0% 0.049 65% 10%
Volatility -0.184 17% 83% 4% 39% -0.451 0% 59% 0.122 18% 5%
LogMktVolume -0.012 43% 57% 3% 10% -0.025 3% 13% -0.016 3% 8%
MktVolatility 0.167 56% 44% 3% 2% 0.037 3% 0% -0.192 3% 3%
Panel C: Dependent Variable = %Pure System
Constant 0.852 69% 31% 20% 5% 1.217 28% 0% 0.227 5% 3%
LogPrice 0.080 56% 44% 30% 17% 0.007 23% 23% 0.026 10% 0%
LogVolume -0.129 3% 97% 1% 91% -0.159 0% 100% 0.072 23% 20%
Volatility 0.263 84% 16% 44% 2% 0.590 64% 0% -0.084 3% 78%
LogMktVolume 0.024 58.6% 41.4% 14% 2% 0.047 18% 0% -0.084 10% 8%
MktVolatility -0.138 46% 54% 2% 5% -0.058 0% 8% 0.336 3% 5%
Deciles 1&2 = 40 Large stocks Deciles 9&10 = 40 Small stocksFull Sample
GMM regressions with Newey-West standard errors (10 lags) are run for each symbol over the 252 trading days in 2004. Mean coefficient estimates and the 
percentage of positive, negative, significantly positive, and significantly negative coefficient estimates, at the 5% significance level, are reported in the table 
below for the full sample, for deciles 1&2 combined, and for deciles 9&10 combined. 
The dependent variables are the demeaned percentage of daily trading volume that occurs in pure floor (%PureFloor), floor and system interaction 
(%Interaction), and pure system (%PureSystem) trades. LogPrice is the natural logarithm of the daily closing price. LogVolume is the natural logarithm of the 
stock's daily trading volume. Volatility is 100 times the daily stock return squared. LogMktVolume is the natural logarithm of the market's daily trading volume. 
MktVolatility is 100 times the daily S&P500 return squared. Data are from CRSP and the NYSE CAUD file.
Table 7: Probit Who-Trades-With-Whom Trade Regressions
Mean 
Estimate
Mean 
Prob. 
Slope
% 
Positive
% 
Negative
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Prob. 
Slope
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Prob. 
Slope
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Probability of Pure Floor Trade
LogTradePrice -1.613 -3.308 47% 53% 29% 33% -0.388 33% 33% -14.447 31% 31%
LogTradeSize 0.234 1.336 98% 2% 93% 0% 1.653 100% 0% 2.814 82% 0%
Quoted Spread 0.011 0.175 96% 4% 84% 0% 0.071 97% 0% 0.472 51% 0%
Quoted Depth -0.029 -0.197 15% 85% 3% 53% -0.041 3% 77% -0.821 3% 26%
15-min. Volume 0.000 0.104 77% 23% 48% 8% 0.019 36% 15% 0.340 38% 0%
15-min. Volatility 45.410 0.109 22% 78% 5% 47% -0.037 0% 56% 0.729 10% 26%
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Probability of Interaction Trade
LogTradePrice 0.057 0.063 53% 47% 38% 36% -0.239 38% 41% 0.722 48% 15%
LogTradeSize 0.247 1.362 99% 1% 98% 1% 1.792 100% 0% 1.004 90% 3%
Quoted Spread 0.023 0.220 99% 1% 98% 0% 0.238 100% 0% 0.235 95% 0%
Quoted Depth -0.003 -0.019 28% 72% 14% 56% -0.021 8% 82% -0.030 5% 45%
15-min. Volume 0.000 0.030 76% 24% 59% 14% 0.005 46% 36% 0.029 53% 0%
15-min. Volatility -11.289 -0.024 19% 81% 9% 64% -0.041 0% 95% -0.005 23% 25%
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Probability of Pure System Trade
LogTradePrice -0.036 -0.014 49% 51% 38% 40% 0.271 41% 44% -0.522 23% 45%
LogTradeSize -0.283 -1.558 1% 99% 1% 98% -2.007 0% 100% -1.210 3% 90%
Quoted Spread -0.025 -0.237 1% 99% 0% 98% -0.257 0% 100% -0.242 0% 95%
Quoted Depth 0.003 0.023 77% 23% 60% 10% 0.024 82% 5% 0.038 50% 5%
15-min. Volume 0.000 -0.039 23% 77% 15% 64% -0.009 38% 46% -0.045 3% 58%
15-min. Volatility 13.148 0.028 82% 18% 69% 8% 0.045 100% 0% 0.005 25% 18%
Probit regressions are run for all trades in each symbol on 40 trading day in 2004. Mean coefficient estimates, mean linear probability slopes, and the percentage of 
positive, negative, significantly positive, and significantly negative coefficient estimates, at the 5% significance level, are reported in the table below for the full sample, 
for deciles 1&2 combined, and for deciles 9&10 combined. 
The dependent variable is the probability of a trade being pure floor, floor and system interaction, or pure system. LogTradePrice is the natural logarithm of the trade 
price. LogTradeSize is the natural logarithm of the trade size. Quoted Spread is the quoted spread at the time of the trade, normalized by the midquote. Quoted depth is 
the average quoted depth at the inside bid and ask at the time of the trade. 15-min. Volume is the dollar volume traded in the stock in the 15 minutes preceding the trade. 
15-min. Volatility is the absolute stock return in the 15 minutes preceding the trade. Intercepts and control variables for previous trade type, daily volume, and half-hour 
intraday intervals are included in the regressions but not reported here. Data are from NYSE CAUD and CQ files, for 40 days in 2004.
Deciles 1&2 = 40 Large stocks Deciles 9&10 = 40 Small stocksFull Sample = 200 stocks
Table 8: Market Quality Regressions on Who-Trades-with-Whom Trade Types
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
Positive
% Sig 
Negative
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Effective Spread (bp)
LogTradePrice -10.3528 7% 75% -10.2494 7% 75% -10.5970 6% 75%
LogTradeSize 1.2053 96% 0% 1.0315 94% 0% 1.1628 96% 0%
Pure Floor -1.1583 10% 31% -1.0256 10% 29% 0.6647 22% 7%
Interaction -0.3846 26% 41% 0.9265 46% 17% 1.2815 40% 4%
  Interaction: Floor-initiated -2.6904 1% 76% -2.5435 2% 66%
  Interaction: System-initiated -0.8742 2% 57% -0.6933 2% 42%
Specialist 0.1614 21% 15%
CAP -1.8730 1% 79%
Direct+ -2.2267 6% 88%
GMM regressions with Newey-West standard errors (10 lags) are run across all trades for each symbol. Mean coefficient estimates and the 
percentage of significantly positive and significantly negative coefficient estimates, at the 5% significance level, are reported in the table below. 
Effective spread is twice the signed difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. Realized spread is twice the 
signed difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade. Effective and realized spreads are normalized by the 
trade price. Information content is the difference between the effective spread and the realized spread. 
LogTradePrice is the natural logarithm of the trade price. LogTradeSize is the natural logarithm of the trade size. The remaining variables are 
indicator variables set equal to one if the trade is in the category, else zero: Pure Floor indicates that the trade involves floor participants (specialist 
and floor brokers) only; Interaction indicates that the trade involves both floor and system participants; Interaction: Floor-initiated indicates that the 
trade is an interaction trade initiated by floor participants; Interaction: System-initiated indicates that the trade is an interaction trade initiated by 
system participants; Specialist indicates that the specialist participates in the trade; CAP indicates that the trade involves execution of a CAP; 
Direct+ indicates that the trade involves automatic execution. Intercepts and control variables for daily volume and half-hour intraday intervals are 
included in the regressions but not reported here. Data are from NYSE CAUD and CQ files, for 40 days in 2004.
Mean 
Estimate
% Sig 
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% Sig 
Negative
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Estimate
% Sig 
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Negative
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Realized  Spread (bp)
LogTradePrice -7.1227 6% 23% -7.2246 6% 22% -7.4144 5% 22%
LogTradeSize -0.6870 1% 42% -0.8701 0% 56% -0.6709 2% 46%
Pure Floor 1.3302 25% 3% 1.5259 26% 3% -2.4740 3% 12%
Interaction 1.2613 48% 4% 3.3732 67% 1% 0.3355 8% 4%
  Interaction: Floor-initiated -4.1067 2% 64% -3.8536 2% 61%
  Interaction: System-initiated -1.0327 13% 10% -0.5397 17% 9%
Specialist 1.9387 37% 2%
CAP 0.8780 19% 3%
Direct+ -6.3788 1% 94%
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Information Content (bp)
LogTradePrice -3.1034 7% 28% -2.9185 7% 29% -3.0473 7% 30%
LogTradeSize 1.9174 88% 0% 1.9263 87% 0% 1.8596 83% 0%
Pure Floor -2.5652 2% 30% -2.6266 2% 33% 3.0404 15% 3%
Interaction -1.6402 2% 59% -2.4514 0% 58% 0.8998 5% 3%
  Interaction: Floor-initiated 1.4439 56% 6% 1.3385 53% 6%
  Interaction: System-initiated 0.1580 7% 17% -0.1493 4% 22%
Specialist -1.7345 2% 32%
CAP -2.7291 0% 43%
Direct+ 4.1820 77% 1%
